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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
discretion of the court. That discretion will be exercised when
substantial prejudice to the opposing party would result from
amendment.
ARTICLE 31 - DISCLOSURE
Accident reports are subject to disclosure.
Recently the courts have been faced with the problem of
reconciling the provisions for exemption from disclosure found in
Sections 3101(c) and 3101(d) of the CPLR. CPLR 31 0 1(c)
grants an absolute immunity from disclosure to the work product
of an attorney, whereas 3101(d) provides only that "any writing
• . . created by or for a party . . . in preparation for litigation"
shall be exempt from disclosure unless a special circumstance
exists.190
In Calace v. Battaglia,'91 a personal injury action, the plaintiff
sought disclosure of a statement given by the defendant to his
insurance company. The court, acknowledging the irreconcilable
conflict in case law in this area,192 held the statement subject to
disclosure. It reasoned that since the policy is to permit maximum
disclosure, "those provisions of CPLR Rule [sic] 3101 which
spell out the exceptions should be narrowly construed to embrace
only what is explicity exempted from disclosure." 193 In accordance
with this liberal policy, it appears that the court did not consider
the statement as either an attorney's work product or material
prepared for litigation.194
A report to a claims agent should not be considered the work
product of an attorney within the purview of 3101(c). By
narrowly construing this absolute privilege the courts could, in
effect, expand the range of discretion under 3101(d), and thus
provide a more flexible standard. It would seem advisable where
ambiguity exists for the courts to apply subsection (d). The
Revisers state that they have adopted the rule of Hicknian v.
Taylor 195 where the Supreme Court held that statements compiled
190 "The following shall not be obtainable unless the court finds that the
material can no longer be duplicated because of a change in conditions and
that withholding it will result in injustice or undue hardship." CPLR
3101(d).
19144 Misc. 2d 97, 252 N.Y.S.2d 973 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
192 Id. at 99, 252 N.Y.S.2d at 975. See cases cited therein.
193 Ibid.
194 Cf. Babcock v. Jackson, 40 Misc. 2d 757, 243 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Sup. Ct.
1963), wherein the court recognized a distinction between a statement taken
by a claims adjuster and one taken by an attorney. "The attorney . . .
in taking a statement, is preparing his case and is working on a legal
theory. Contrary to this, claims agents are making routine investigations
for the company's records and are not preparing only for trial." Id. at 761,
243 N.Y.S.2d at 720.
195 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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by an attorney may only be subject to disclosure where special
circumstances exist. Since there would be no constitutional pro-
hibition against affording an attorney's work product the qualified,
as opposed to the absolute privilege, there should be no objection
to resolving the close cases in favor of allowing the court the
broadest possible discretion.
CPLR 3101(d) affords a privilege to any "material prepared
for litigation" 196 thus allowing a broad spectrum for judicial inter-
pretation. The Revisers concluded that "whether an internal
business report . . . is designed for use in litigation . . . may
be a close question best left to the courts." 197 It would appear
appropriate for the courts to decide each issue on an ad hoc basis
due to the infinite purposes for which such reports may be
used.
An amendment to CPLR 3101 seems desirable. Elimination
of the absolute privilege of 3101(c) and inclusion of the attorney's
work product under the qualified privilege of 3101(d) would more
accurately adhere to the Hickman doctrine, and correspondingly,
would eliminate the problem of determining whether a particular
item is an attorney's work product. The only question would
then be whether the material was primarily for use in litigation,
and if so, whether special circumstances existed. This would allow
judicial discretion in accord with the liberal philosophy of disclosure
and yet retain ample protection under CPLR 3101.'19
CPLR 3117(a)(1): Prior deposition of party not admissible to
contradict his own testimony.
CPLR 3117(a) (1) provides that "any deposition may be used
by any party for the purpose of contradicting or impeaching the
testimony of the deponent as a witness. ... 19 The query is
196 It should be noted that the word "material" contemplates not only
writings, but photographs as well. This is illustrated by the recent case of
Murdick v. Bush, 44 Misc. 2d 527, 254 N.Y.S.2d 54 (Sup. Ct. 1964), where
the court decided that photographs of the scene of an accident taken on the
day of the accident were subject to disclosure. Since the photographs merely
showed the scene as it existed, they were not the product of an attorney's
mind and hence, were not privileged under CPLR 3101(c). However, the
photographs were "material prepared for litigation" under 3101(d). Thus, they
became the proper subject for disclosure since a special circumstance was
shown.
The federal courts are in accord with this position. Nickels v. United
States, 25 F.R.D. 210 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
'19 FIRST REP. 120.
198 "The court may at any time . . . make a protective order denying
the use of any disclosure device." CPLR 3103(a). For a recent case in
accord with the position taken by The Biannual Survey see Montgomery
Ward Co. v. City of Lockport 44 Misc. 2d 923, 255 N.Y.S.2d 433 (Sup.
Ct. 1964).
199This section should be read in conjunction with CPLR 4514.
(Emphasis added.)
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